本周早些时候，家得宝宣布其旗下一家子公司将以约43亿美元收购建筑材料分销商GMS。家得宝在这场竞购战中胜出，此举充分表明，在自助装修市场面临严峻挑战之际，这家家居装修连锁巨头正全力以赴争夺专业承包商市场。
GMS，全称为Gypsum Management and Supply，总部位于佐治亚州塔克市，绝非最引人注目的收购目标。然而，它拥有由约320个分销中心组成的庞大网络，供应石膏墙板、天花板、钢结构框架及其他建筑材料。此外，GMS还运营着约100个面向住宅及商业合同客户的工具销售、租赁及服务中心，这些正是家得宝觊觎的业务。
此次交易是在家得宝去年以180亿美元收购SRS Distribution（实际收购GMS的主体）之后达成的。这是该公司有史以来规模最大的一笔收购，旨在助力家得宝在规模庞大的专业承包商细分市场中赢得更大份额。这些客户过去很少光顾家得宝和劳氏（Lowe’s），更倾向于与专门服务专业人士的家居装修零售商合作。
科文公司（Cowen）分析师马克斯·拉克伦科（Max Rakhlenko）在一份研究报告中写道，通过收购GMS，SRS将在面向专业客户的户外（屋顶、泳池、庭院）和室内（石膏墙板、钢结构框架、天花板）供应商市场中占据主导地位。拉克伦科对这笔交易给予了高度评价，称其“将使SRS拓展至更多垂直领域，提升市场份额，整合行业资源，并显著扩大家得宝的供应链与分销网络”。
尽管市场对家得宝收购GMS的消息既未表现出兴奋，也未感到担忧（消息公布当天，其股价持平），但这两项交易共同表明，家得宝正在战略层面进行重大且经过审慎考量的调整。家得宝素来被公认为是过去20年最成功的零售商之一，它巧妙利用了火热的房地产市场——这一市场促使更多人翻新自家房屋。但如今，家得宝认为，未来的强劲增长不能仅依赖2000家大型门店所服务的那些进行相对简单家居项目的客户。相反，它希望在专业人士为更复杂项目（如泳池安装、屋顶维修）下达的大额订单中分得一杯羹。在本财年第一季度，家得宝美国地区开业至少一年的门店销售额仅增长0.2%，这凸显了更新战略的必要性。
“拓展专业客户业务是我们增长战略的关键部分。”家得宝美国门店与运营高级执行副总裁安-玛丽·坎贝尔（Ann-Marie Campbell）在2月对华尔街分析师表示。这也是任职三年的首席执行官泰德·德克尔，在竭力延续该零售商前两任首席执行官任内取得的巨大成功时，所依托的核心战略。
这些交易提醒人们，家得宝在并购战略方面向来深思熟虑。大约20年前，家得宝的并购重点是收购品牌以丰富店内商品种类；到了2010年代，它转而投入资源提升电商实力与物流能力，并为门店配备支持线上销售的设施；近期，其重心转向为智能家居产品等增长领域实现商品种类的现代化升级。
这种并购策略为这家以严谨著称的零售商带来了丰厚回报，也使其在销售增长方面长期领先于主要竞争对手劳氏：去年，家得宝年销售额突破1595亿美元，几乎是十年前的两倍。
在零售和消费品领域，许多并购交易非但未能推动企业实现转型，反而导致巨额资产减记，因此家得宝的并购策略令人耳目一新。
劳氏曾耗时数年收购加拿大零售商Rona，以求在北美北部市场站稳脚跟，却在两年前将其出售，为此蒙受了约20亿美元的损失；泰佩思琦（Tapestry）2017年收购凯特·丝蓓（Kate Spade），该品牌上季度销售额下滑13%，已多次引发资产减记；卡普里控股有限公司（Capri Holdings）近期出售范思哲（Versace）时亦蒙受重大损失；沃博联（Walgreens Boots Alliance）几年前收购2000家来德爱（Rite Aid）门店，最终被证明是巨额资金浪费；今年早些时候，可口可乐（Coca-Cola）因BodyArmor运动饮料销量不佳，对其进行了7.6亿美元的资产减记；美元树（Dollar Tree）也宣布将以巨额亏损价格出售旗下Family Dollar子公司。
类似案例不胜枚举。约70%的并购交易最终以失败告终。其中不少交易仿佛是品牌为求增长而孤注一掷的“绝望一搏”，或是为了击垮竞争对手，亦或单纯源于企业高估了自身盘活另一家公司的能力。诚然，人们担心并购周期可能会在短期内对家得宝的利润率形成挤压。但从长期来看，其审慎周全的并购策略已取得显著成效，应成为大型企业开展并购交易的典范。 （*）
译者：中慧言-王芳
家得宝（Home Depot）首席执行官泰德·德克尔（Ted Decker）已任职三年，希望延续这家零售商的成功——前两任首席执行官已带领公司创下辉煌业绩。
本周早些时候，家得宝宣布其旗下一家子公司将以约43亿美元收购建筑材料分销商GMS。家得宝在这场竞购战中胜出，此举充分表明，在自助装修市场面临严峻挑战之际，这家家居装修连锁巨头正全力以赴争夺专业承包商市场。
GMS，全称为Gypsum Management and Supply，总部位于佐治亚州塔克市，绝非最引人注目的收购目标。然而，它拥有由约320个分销中心组成的庞大网络，供应石膏墙板、天花板、钢结构框架及其他建筑材料。此外，GMS还运营着约100个面向住宅及商业合同客户的工具销售、租赁及服务中心，这些正是家得宝觊觎的业务。
此次交易是在家得宝去年以180亿美元收购SRS Distribution（实际收购GMS的主体）之后达成的。这是该公司有史以来规模最大的一笔收购，旨在助力家得宝在规模庞大的专业承包商细分市场中赢得更大份额。这些客户过去很少光顾家得宝和劳氏（Lowe’s），更倾向于与专门服务专业人士的家居装修零售商合作。
科文公司（Cowen）分析师马克斯·拉克伦科（Max Rakhlenko）在一份研究报告中写道，通过收购GMS，SRS将在面向专业客户的户外（屋顶、泳池、庭院）和室内（石膏墙板、钢结构框架、天花板）供应商市场中占据主导地位。拉克伦科对这笔交易给予了高度评价，称其“将使SRS拓展至更多垂直领域，提升市场份额，整合行业资源，并显著扩大家得宝的供应链与分销网络”。
尽管市场对家得宝收购GMS的消息既未表现出兴奋，也未感到担忧（消息公布当天，其股价持平），但这两项交易共同表明，家得宝正在战略层面进行重大且经过审慎考量的调整。家得宝素来被公认为是过去20年最成功的零售商之一，它巧妙利用了火热的房地产市场——这一市场促使更多人翻新自家房屋。但如今，家得宝认为，未来的强劲增长不能仅依赖2000家大型门店所服务的那些进行相对简单家居项目的客户。相反，它希望在专业人士为更复杂项目（如泳池安装、屋顶维修）下达的大额订单中分得一杯羹。在本财年第一季度，家得宝美国地区开业至少一年的门店销售额仅增长0.2%，这凸显了更新战略的必要性。
“拓展专业客户业务是我们增长战略的关键部分。”家得宝美国门店与运营高级执行副总裁安-玛丽·坎贝尔（Ann-Marie Campbell）在2月对华尔街分析师表示。这也是任职三年的首席执行官泰德·德克尔，在竭力延续该零售商前两任首席执行官任内取得的巨大成功时，所依托的核心战略。
这些交易提醒人们，家得宝在并购战略方面向来深思熟虑。大约20年前，家得宝的并购重点是收购品牌以丰富店内商品种类；到了2010年代，它转而投入资源提升电商实力与物流能力，并为门店配备支持线上销售的设施；近期，其重心转向为智能家居产品等增长领域实现商品种类的现代化升级。
这种并购策略为这家以严谨著称的零售商带来了丰厚回报，也使其在销售增长方面长期领先于主要竞争对手劳氏：去年，家得宝年销售额突破1595亿美元，几乎是十年前的两倍。
在零售和消费品领域，许多并购交易非但未能推动企业实现转型，反而导致巨额资产减记，因此家得宝的并购策略令人耳目一新。
劳氏曾耗时数年收购加拿大零售商Rona，以求在北美北部市场站稳脚跟，却在两年前将其出售，为此蒙受了约20亿美元的损失；泰佩思琦（Tapestry）2017年收购凯特·丝蓓（Kate Spade），该品牌上季度销售额下滑13%，已多次引发资产减记；卡普里控股有限公司（Capri Holdings）近期出售范思哲（Versace）时亦蒙受重大损失；沃博联（Walgreens Boots Alliance）几年前收购2000家来德爱（Rite Aid）门店，最终被证明是巨额资金浪费；今年早些时候，可口可乐（Coca-Cola）因BodyArmor运动饮料销量不佳，对其进行了7.6亿美元的资产减记；美元树（Dollar Tree）也宣布将以巨额亏损价格出售旗下Family Dollar子公司。
类似案例不胜枚举。约70%的并购交易最终以失败告终。其中不少交易仿佛是品牌为求增长而孤注一掷的“绝望一搏”，或是为了击垮竞争对手，亦或单纯源于企业高估了自身盘活另一家公司的能力。诚然，人们担心并购周期可能会在短期内对家得宝的利润率形成挤压。但从长期来看，其审慎周全的并购策略已取得显著成效，应成为大型企业开展并购交易的典范。 （*）
译者：中慧言-王芳
Earlier this week, Home Depot said one of its business units was buying building-products distributor GMS for some $4.3 billion, prevailing in a bidding war and showing just how seriously the home-improvement chain is about winning the market for professional contractors at a time the do-it-yourself market is tough going.
GMS, whose name stands for Gypsum Management and Supply and which is based in Tucker, Ga., is hardly the sexiest acquisition target. But then again, it has a wide network of some 320 distribution centers that offer thing like wallboard, ceilings, steel framing, and other construction items. What’s more, GMS operates roughly 100 tool sales, rental, and service centers for residential and commercial contract customers, all things Home Depot covets.
The deal follows Home Depot’s $18 billion landmark acquisition last year of SRS Distribution (which is the entity actually buying GMS). That was the largest acquisition in the company’s history, aimed at helping Home Depot win a much bigger share of the mammoth professional-contractors segment. Those customers have typically made little use of Home Depot and Lowe’s and worked more closely with home-improvement retailers that cater to professionals.
With the GMS deal, SRS will dominate the market for professional suppliers both outside the home (roofing, pool, yard) and inside (wallboard, steel framing, and ceilings), Cowen analyst Max Rakhlenko wrote in a research note. Rakhlenko praised the deal, saying it “would allow SRS to expand into additional verticals, grow market share, consolidate the industry, and meaningfully increase HD’s supply chain and distribution network.”
While the market was neither excited nor alarmed by Home Depot’s GMS news (its shares were flat on the day the deal was announced), the deals together show Home Depot is making a major, thoughtful pivot in its strategy. Home Depot is widely viewed as one of the most successful retailers of the last 20 years, one that has deftly leveraged a hot housing market that led to more people renovating their homes. But now, Home Depot believes that robust growth in the future won’t come just from its 2,000 big-box stores serving people doing relatively simple home projects. Instead, it wants a share of the large orders placed by professionals for much more involved projects such as swimming pool installations and roof repairs. In its first quarter of the current fiscal year, sales at U.S. stores open for at least a year rose a paltry 0.2%, showing the need for this updated strategy.
“Growing pro is a key part of our growth strategy,” Ann-Marie Campbell, senior executive vice president of U.S. stores and operations at Home Depot, told Wall Street analysts in February. And it is the cornerstone of Home Depot’s CEO of three years, Ted Decker, in his efforts to perpetuate the success of a retailer that had succeeded wildly under his two predecessors.
The deals are a reminder of how thoughtful Home Depot has long been in its M&A strategy. About 20 years ago, Home Depot focused its M&A on acquiring brands to fill out its in-store assortment. Then, in the 2010s, it invested in its e-commerce firepower and logistics, and equipping stores to support digital sales. More recently, the focus was on modernizing its assortment for growing areas like smart home products.
That M&A approach has served the famously disciplined retailer well and helped it long outperform archrival Lowe’s in terms of sales growth: Last year, Home Depot’s annual sales topped $159.5 billion, almost double what they were a decade earlier.
And it is refreshing when one looks at so many of the deals in the retail and consumer goods world that have not transformed companies but instead led to big write-downs.
Lowe’s spent years pursuing Canadian retailer Rona to get a foothold north of the border, only to sell it off two years ago and losing about $2 billion in the process. Tapestry’s acquisition in 2017 of Kate Spade, whose sales fell 13% last quarter, has led to a number of write-downs. Capri Holdings recently sold Versace at a big loss. Walgreens Boots Alliance’s purchase a few years ago of 2,000 Rite Aid stores proved to be a major waste of money. Earlier this year, Coca-Cola took a $760 million write-down of its BodyArmor sports drink because of disappointing sales, and Dollar Tree said it was selling its Family Dollar division at a great loss.
And on and on it goes. Some 70% of M&A deals end up being failures. A good many of them can feel like Hail Mary passes by a brand desperate for growth, or a way to take out a rival, or simply the result of one company overestimating its ability to turn around another. Yes, there are concerns that an M&A cycle could pinch Home Depot’s margins in the short term. But Home Depot’s deliberate and thoughtful approach to M&A has largely paid off over the long term, and should serve as a model to big companies in how to do successful dealmaking.