
马睿考察中国人工智能枢纽后在社交媒体X上写道:“我们所到之处,人们都认为能源供应是理所当然的。”
对美国人工智能研究者而言,这近乎天方夜谭。高盛(Goldman Sachs)警告称,在美国,AI需求激增正与脆弱的电网激烈碰撞,这种极端瓶颈可能严重阻碍行业的发展。
马睿指出,在中国,电力供应被认为是个“早已解决的问题”。
中国科技领域知名专家、媒体公司Tech Buzz China创始人马睿率团队实地考察中国AI产业的发展。她向《财富》杂志表示,虽然她并非能源专家,但她通过密集参加会议和业内人士访谈得出的结论会令硅谷脊背发凉:在中国,为数据中心保障充足电力早已无需争论。
她在X上写道:“这与美国形成鲜明对比。美国AI产业的发展日益受到数据中心能耗争议与电网限制的制约。”
事态严重性难以估量。数据中心建设是AI产业发展的基石,新数据中心投资对美国GDP的影响现在已超越消费者支出,这种情况令人担忧,因为后者通常占经济总量的三分之二。麦肯锡(McKinsey)预测2025年至2030年间,全球企业需投入6.7万亿美元扩建数据中心容量,以满足AI需求。
Stifel Nicolaus投行近期的研报预警标普500指数面临回调风险,因为该投行预测数据中心基建热潮属一次性投资,而消费支出正持续萎缩。
德勤(Deloitte)行业调查显示,美国数据中心基础设施发展的核心制约因素在于电网承受的压力。城市电网极其脆弱,迫使一些企业自建电厂,而不是依靠现有电网。民众因电费飙升而日益不满。在俄亥俄州,今年夏天普通家庭的电费支出因数据中心至少上涨15美元,而能源公司则被迫应对需求激增带来的剧变。
高盛直指危机本质:“AI产业无节制的电力需求增长速度,正超越电网的十年发展周期,形成致命瓶颈。”
深耕中国能源领域多年的电力专家余德伟对《财富》杂志表示,电力在中国根本不成问题。中国年均新增用电需求超过德国全年的用电总量。农村地区到处都有屋顶太阳能,一个省的发电量相当于印度全国的供电量。
余德伟表示:“美国决策者应祈祷中国保持竞争者而非进攻者姿态,因为目前美国在能源基建领域毫无竞争力。”
中国电力供应过剩
余德伟解释称,中国在电力领域悄然树立的霸主地位,源于数十年来在发电、输电、新一代核电等各环节的大量建设和投资。
他表示,中国的备用裕度始终维持在80%-100%,这意味着中国常年保有双倍必需产能。他补充道,中国有充裕的冗余空间,使AI数据中心被视作“消纳过剩产能”的便捷途径,而非对电网稳定的威胁。
这种缓冲水平在美国不可想象。美国区域电网的备用裕度通常只有15%甚至更低,而在遭遇极端天气时情况更糟。在加州或得州等地,官员经常在预测需求将导致电力系统紧张时发布警报。余德伟强调,这种状况导致电网没有空间消化AI基础设施所需的负荷激增。
两国之间的备战差距触目惊心:当美国深陷电网能否跟上产业发展步伐的政经博弈时,中国已在充裕供电基础上全速推进。
余德伟表示,即便中国AI需求增速超越可再生能源建设节奏,闲置的煤电厂也可填补空缺,同时建设更多可持续能源。他承认:“虽然这并非最优解决方案,但切实可行。”
他表示,反观美国,新建发电容量审批动辄延误数年,还要面对地方抵制和市场规则碎片化。
治理架构差异
硬件优势背后是治理模式差异。余德伟指出,中国的能源规划由技术官僚主导的长期政策协调,在开始投资之前先确立市场规则。这种模式确保了基础设施建设是提前预判需求的主动行为,而不是需求出现后的被动应对。
余德伟表示:“中国的模式以‘全垒打’为目标,更具有前瞻性。而美国最多只能勉强上垒。”
美国大型基建严重依赖私人资本,但多数投资者要求三至五年回报周期,这对需十年才能建成并开始带来回报的电力项目而言过短。
他表示:“资本严重偏向短期收益。”他指出硅谷将数十亿资金投入“第N代软件服务”,而能源项目却要苦苦寻找资金。
中国则由国家预先投资战略领域,接受部分项目失败,但确保必要时产能就位。余德伟断言,若无公共资金化解长期投资风险,美国政经体系根本无力构建未来电网。
文化认知强化了这种差异。在中国,可再生能源因经济和战略价值被定位为基础产业,而非道德绑架的工具;煤炭未被污名化为“邪恶象征”,只是被视为落后产能。余德伟认为,这种务实思维让决策者聚焦于效率和结果,而不是陷入政治斗争。
余德伟的结论很直白。除非美国彻底变革建设和投资能源基础设施的模式,否则中国的领先优势将持续扩大。
他表示:“能力差距不仅将日益凸显,更会在未来数年持续扩大。”(*)
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
马睿考察中国人工智能枢纽后在社交媒体X上写道:“我们所到之处,人们都认为能源供应是理所当然的。”
对美国人工智能研究者而言,这近乎天方夜谭。高盛(Goldman Sachs)警告称,在美国,AI需求激增正与脆弱的电网激烈碰撞,这种极端瓶颈可能严重阻碍行业的发展。
马睿指出,在中国,电力供应被认为是个“早已解决的问题”。
中国科技领域知名专家、媒体公司Tech Buzz China创始人马睿率团队实地考察中国AI产业的发展。她向《财富》杂志表示,虽然她并非能源专家,但她通过密集参加会议和业内人士访谈得出的结论会令硅谷脊背发凉:在中国,为数据中心保障充足电力早已无需争论。
她在X上写道:“这与美国形成鲜明对比。美国AI产业的发展日益受到数据中心能耗争议与电网限制的制约。”
事态严重性难以估量。数据中心建设是AI产业发展的基石,新数据中心投资对美国GDP的影响现在已超越消费者支出,这种情况令人担忧,因为后者通常占经济总量的三分之二。麦肯锡(McKinsey)预测2025年至2030年间,全球企业需投入6.7万亿美元扩建数据中心容量,以满足AI需求。
Stifel Nicolaus投行近期的研报预警标普500指数面临回调风险,因为该投行预测数据中心基建热潮属一次性投资,而消费支出正持续萎缩。
德勤(Deloitte)行业调查显示,美国数据中心基础设施发展的核心制约因素在于电网承受的压力。城市电网极其脆弱,迫使一些企业自建电厂,而不是依靠现有电网。民众因电费飙升而日益不满。在俄亥俄州,今年夏天普通家庭的电费支出因数据中心至少上涨15美元,而能源公司则被迫应对需求激增带来的剧变。
高盛直指危机本质:“AI产业无节制的电力需求增长速度,正超越电网的十年发展周期,形成致命瓶颈。”
深耕中国能源领域多年的电力专家余德伟对《财富》杂志表示,电力在中国根本不成问题。中国年均新增用电需求超过德国全年的用电总量。农村地区到处都有屋顶太阳能,一个省的发电量相当于印度全国的供电量。
余德伟表示:“美国决策者应祈祷中国保持竞争者而非进攻者姿态,因为目前美国在能源基建领域毫无竞争力。”
中国电力供应过剩
余德伟解释称,中国在电力领域悄然树立的霸主地位,源于数十年来在发电、输电、新一代核电等各环节的大量建设和投资。
他表示,中国的备用裕度始终维持在80%-100%,这意味着中国常年保有双倍必需产能。他补充道,中国有充裕的冗余空间,使AI数据中心被视作“消纳过剩产能”的便捷途径,而非对电网稳定的威胁。
这种缓冲水平在美国不可想象。美国区域电网的备用裕度通常只有15%甚至更低,而在遭遇极端天气时情况更糟。在加州或得州等地,官员经常在预测需求将导致电力系统紧张时发布警报。余德伟强调,这种状况导致电网没有空间消化AI基础设施所需的负荷激增。
两国之间的备战差距触目惊心:当美国深陷电网能否跟上产业发展步伐的政经博弈时,中国已在充裕供电基础上全速推进。
余德伟表示,即便中国AI需求增速超越可再生能源建设节奏,闲置的煤电厂也可填补空缺,同时建设更多可持续能源。他承认:“虽然这并非最优解决方案,但切实可行。”
他表示,反观美国,新建发电容量审批动辄延误数年,还要面对地方抵制和市场规则碎片化。
治理架构差异
硬件优势背后是治理模式差异。余德伟指出,中国的能源规划由技术官僚主导的长期政策协调,在开始投资之前先确立市场规则。这种模式确保了基础设施建设是提前预判需求的主动行为,而不是需求出现后的被动应对。
余德伟表示:“中国的模式以‘全垒打’为目标,更具有前瞻性。而美国最多只能勉强上垒。”
美国大型基建严重依赖私人资本,但多数投资者要求三至五年回报周期,这对需十年才能建成并开始带来回报的电力项目而言过短。
他表示:“资本严重偏向短期收益。”他指出硅谷将数十亿资金投入“第N代软件服务”,而能源项目却要苦苦寻找资金。
中国则由国家预先投资战略领域,接受部分项目失败,但确保必要时产能就位。余德伟断言,若无公共资金化解长期投资风险,美国政经体系根本无力构建未来电网。
文化认知强化了这种差异。在中国,可再生能源因经济和战略价值被定位为基础产业,而非道德绑架的工具;煤炭未被污名化为“邪恶象征”,只是被视为落后产能。余德伟认为,这种务实思维让决策者聚焦于效率和结果,而不是陷入政治斗争。
余德伟的结论很直白。除非美国彻底变革建设和投资能源基础设施的模式,否则中国的领先优势将持续扩大。
他表示:“能力差距不仅将日益凸显,更会在未来数年持续扩大。”(*)
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
“Everywhere we went, people treated energy availability as a given,” Rui Ma wrote on X after returning from a recent tour of China’s AI hubs.
For American AI researchers, that’s almost unimaginable. In the U.S., surging AI demand is colliding with a fragile power grid, the kind of extreme bottleneck that Goldman Sachs warns could severely choke the industry’s growth.
In China, Ma continued, it’s considered a “solved problem.”
Ma, a renowned expert in Chinese technology and founder of the media company Tech Buzz China, took her team on the road to get a firsthand look at the country’s AI advancements. She told Fortune that while she isn’t an energy expert, she attended enough meetings and talked to enough insiders to come away with a conclusion that should send chills down the spine of Silicon Valley: in China, building enough power for data centers is no longer up for debate.
“This is a stark contrast to the U.S., where AI growth is increasingly tied to debates over data center power consumption and grid limitations,” she wrote on X.
The stakes are difficult to overstate. Data center building is the foundation of AI advancement, and spending on new centers now displaces consumer spending in terms of impact to U.S. GDP—that’s concerning since consumer spending is generally two-thirds of the pie. McKinsey projects that between 2025 and 2030, companies worldwide will need to invest $6.7 trillion into new data center capacity to keep up with AI’s strain.
In a recent research note, Stifel Nicolaus warned of a looming correction to the S&P 500, since it forecasts this data-center capex boom to be a one-off build-out of infrastructure, while consumer spending is clearly on the wane.
However, the clear limiting factor to the U.S.’s data center infrastructure development, according to a Deloitte industry survey, is stress on the power grid. Cities’ power grids are so weak that some companies are just building their own power plants rather than relying on existing grids. The public is growing increasingly frustrated over increasing energy bills – in Ohio, the electricity bill for a typical household has increased at least $15 this summer from the data centers – while energy companies prepare for a sea-change of surging demand.
Goldman Sachs frames the crisis simply: “AI’s insatiable power demand is outpacing the grid’s decade-long development cycles, creating a critical bottleneck.”
Meanwhile, David Fishman, a Chinese electricity expert who has spent years tracking their energy development, told Fortune that in China, electricity isn’t even a question. On average, China adds more electricity demand than the entire annual consumption of Germany, every single year. Whole rural provinces are blanketed in rooftop solar, with one province matching the entirety of India’s electricity supply.
“U.S. policymakers should be hoping China stays a competitor and not an aggressor,” Fishman said. “Because right now they can’t compete effectively on the energy infrastructure front.”
China has an oversupply of electricty
China’s quiet electricity dominance, Fishman explained, is the result of decades of deliberate overbuilding and investment in every layer of the power sector, from generation to transmission to next-generation nuclear.
The country’s reserve margin has never dipped below 80%–100% nationwide, meaning it has consistently maintained at least twice the capacity it needs, Fishman said. They have so much available space that instead of seeing AI data centers as a threat to grid stability, China treats them as a convenient way to “soak up oversupply,” he added.
That level of cushion is unthinkable in the United States, where regional grids typically operate with a 15% reserve margin and sometimes less, particularly during extreme weather, Fishman said. In places like California or Texas, officials often issue warnings about red-flag conditions when demand is projected to strain the system. This leaves little room to absorb the rapid load increases AI infrastructure requires, Fishman ntoed.
The gap in readiness is stark: while the U.S. is already experiencing political and economic fights over whether the grid can keep up, China is operating from a position of abundance.
Even if AI demand in China grows so quickly renewable projects can’t keep pace, Fishman said, the country can tap idle coal plants to bridge the gap while building more sustainable sources. “It’s not preferable,” he admitted, “but it’s doable.”
By contrast, the U.S. would have to scramble to bring on new generation capacity, often facing years-long permitting delays, local opposition, and fragmented market rules, he said.
Structural governance differences
Underpinning the hardware advantage is a difference in governance. In China, energy planning is coordinated by long-term, technocratic policy that defines the market’s rules before investments are made, Fishman said. This model ensures infrastructure buildout happens in anticipation of demand, not in reaction to it.
“They’re set up to hit grand slams,” Fishman noted. “The U.S., at best, can get on base.”
In the U.S., large-scale infrastructure projects depend heavily on private investment, but most investors expect a return within three to five years: far too short for power projects that can take a decade to build and pay off.
“Capital is really biased toward shorter-term returns,” he said, noting Silicon Valley has funneled billions into “the nth iteration of software-as-a-service” while energy projects fight for funding.
In China, by contrast, the state directs money toward strategic sectors in advance of demand, accepting not every project will succeed but ensuring the capacity is in place when it’s needed. Without public financing to de-risk long-term bets, he argued, the U.S. political and economic system is simply not set up to build the grid of the future.
Cultural attitudes reinforce this approach. In China, renewables are framed as a cornerstone of the economy because they make sense economically and strategically, not because they carry moral weight. Coal use isn’t cast as a sign of villainy, as it would be among some circles in the U.S. – it’s simply seen as outdated. This pragmatic framing, Fishman argued, allows policymakers to focus on efficiency and results rather than political battles.
For Fishman, the takeaway is blunt. Without a dramatic shift in how the U.S. builds and funds its energy infrastructure, China’s lead will only widen.
“The gap in capability is only going to continue to become more obvious — and grow in the coming years,” he said.